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Black Disaffection from the
Republican Party During the
Presidency of Herbert Hoover,
1928-1932
GEORGE F . GARCIA
U N E MAJOR CHANGE in twentieth-century American voting pat-
terns has been the shift of black Americans from the party of
Lincoln to that of Franklin D. Roosevelt. For some historians
the real beginning of this shift dates not to 1933 but to 1928.^
In that election year, Herbert Hoover became the first Repub-
lican president since Reconstruction to break the Solid South.
Buoyed by his unprecedented victory, Republican leaders re-
vived the old lily-white southern strategy in an attempt to
permanently capture the South for the G.O.P.^ Basically, this
policy required purging black Republicans from leadership posi-
tions in the southern wing of the G.O.P. and replacing them
with respectable, business-oriented southern whites. In theory,
'John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom (New York: Vintage Books,
1969), p. 524. Franklin, the dean of black historians, writes that "the real dis-
affection of Negroes in the Party of Lincoln began in 1928 when Republicans
attempted to resurrect a strong party in the South under white leadership."
^For a history of this lily-white strategy, see Vincent DeSantis, Republicans
Face the Southern Question: The New Departure Years, 1877-1897 (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 66-103; Vincent DeSantis, "Republican
Efforts to 'Crack the Democratic South,' " Review of Politics 14 (April 1952):
247-252; Stanley P. Hirshson, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt (Bloomington:
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adoption of a lily-white stance by the national party leadership
would symbolically cut off the party's abolitionist legacy and
thus attract southern whites into its ranks. Moreover, respect-
able white Republican leadership in the South, the Hoover
strategists argued, would draw that region into the mainstream
of national progress, and a strong two-party system would
develop. Gradually, as education, economic development, and
the spread of a cooperative spirit changed attitudes and local
customs, southern blacks would also be granted the benefits of
the American system.' In launching the southern strategy, the
Hoover team had expected only a relatively minor response
among northern blacks, but this was not what they provoked.
Inadvertently, they provided an issue around which the more
militant black leaders, the men who had already become thor-
oughly disenchanted with the "clutches of Republican treach-
ery,"" could rally. Quickly denouncing Hoover's call for a "lily-
white party" as a betrayal of American ideals, they mounted an
educational and political campaign that had a significant impact
on blacks' party loyalties.
The first wave of black protest was touched off by Hoover's
official announcement of his administration's plans for the
South. To most black editors and journalists, the president's
talk of cleaning up corruption, putting the southern G.O.P. in
the hands of enlightened public servants, and paving the way
for a two-party system in which blacks could eventually partici-
pate, was evidence either of sheer hypocrisy or of political inep-
titude. To W. E. B. DuBois, for example, the "Great Humani-
tarian" was either a white supremacist trying to mask a
basically racist appeal to the white South, or he was "extremely
naive" in his faith that "the political owners of the Solid South"
Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 21-44; Richard Sherman, The Republican
Party and Black America: From McKinley to Hoover, 1898-1933 (Charlottes-
ville, Va.; University Press, 1973).
'For an account of Hoover's southern strategy, see George F. Garcia, "Her-
bert Hoover's Southern Strategy and the Black Reaction" (M.A. thesis. Uni-
versity of Iowa, 1972).
"The phrase is from the Chicago Defender, 4 June 1930, p. 2.
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were going to give up the "tremendous power and wealth" that
their "political usurpation" had put in their grasp.' Other
critics saw much hypocrisy, both in expecting northern blacks
to sanction overt discrimination in the South and in Hoover's
tendency to see corruption only in the black-dominated Repub-
lican organizations, not in such equally corrupt lily-white
machines as the one in Texas. In addition to such criticism in the
black press, Hoover's announcement also brought hundreds of
protesting letters and telegrams from black business leaders,
fraternities, churches, and educational institutions, all express-
ing resentment over his betrayal of traditional Republican ideals.
Typical of many of these was a letter from Harry Pace, president
of the National Negro Insurance Association, arguing that the
movement toward lily-whiteism was not only "unjustifiable" but
"un-American and contrary to the fundamental principles of our
government." It had, so Pace claimed, "pained the hearts of
practically every Negro in America."* Significantly, some black
leaders who had backed Hoover in 1928 and early 1929 now be-
came much more critical. One notable example was Robert R.
Church, the leader of the black political machine in Memphis,
who, prior to the president's announcement, had been strongly
discounting rumors that the administration would actively push
a policy of lily-whiteism.'After the announcement, he began
emphasizing the "disappointment of colored people" with the
Republican "conspiracy" against them and warning Hoover
that the southern strategy adopted by his administration would
"leave the Republican party a wreck upon the shores of the
political ocean."'
^Crisis 36 (April 1929): 131.
»Pace to Hoover, 27 April 1929, Colored Question file. Presidential Papers,
Herbert Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch,
Iowa (hereafter cited as HHP).
^Chicago Defender, 8 March 1929, p. 1. Church was quoted as saying; "In
my opinion Mr. Hoover will prove a shocking disappointment to both the
small but important element of Colored Republicans, who fear that his silence
gives consent to their prosecutors, and the close-knit band of famished lilies
and suitcase Democrats who expect him to put Colored people back into
slavery."
»Church to Hoover, 6 November 1929, Colored Question file, HHP.
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This is not to say, of course, that black opinion was unani-
mous in 1929. Nor was it so strongly anti-Hoover as it would
later become. Men like Robert R. Moton still seemed convinced
that the president was a genuine friend of the black race, and
that once the corrupt black-and-tan leadership was purged from
the southern G.O.P., a respectable racially integrated Republi-
can party would emerge as a viable political force in the South. '
From Arthur W. Mitchell, who, with the advent of the New
Deal, was to switch parties and become the first black Demo-
crat ever elected to Congress, came a similar though less
favorable opinion. As he saw it, he told Hoover, those blacks
who were aware of the "deplorable conditions in the South"
should support efforts to establish a "two-party government,"
particularly since nothing had "done more to retard the
progress of the Negro" than the "incompetent and fraudulent
leadership" characteristic of southern Republicanism. Yet ex-
treme lily-whiteism, Mitchell continued, was both unnecessary
and undesirable, even as a temporary stage. The goal could be
achieved by giving "substantial colored men and women" a
share of the responsibility for reform.^"
Even such friends of the administration, however, found it
difficult to maintain their position when the second wave of
black protest began taking shape in the spring of 1930, touched
off by Hoover's appointment of Judge John J. Parker of North
Carolina to the Supreme Court. Parker's appointment was part
of Hoover's overall plan to repay key southern "Hoovercrats"
who had given him support by bolting the Democratic party in
the election of 1928. To the president this appointment seemed
safe enough, particularly since Parker had a distinguished
career behind him: first as a relatively popular though unsuc-
cessful Republican candidate for various state offices, then as a
'Moton to Walter H. Newton, 22 February 1930, Colored Question file,
HHP; Albon Holsey to Francis E. Rivers, 12 October 1932, Colored Question
file, HHP; Claude Barnett to George Akerson, 19 November 1930, Colored
Question file, HHP. All of these men while supporting Hoover's reform pro-
gram, did urge the president to appoint able blacks to the revamped G.O.P.
organizations in the South.
'"Mitchell to Hoover, 30 March 1929, Colored Question file, HHP.
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highly successful lawyer and special assistant during the investi-
gations into alleged war frauds, and finally in the circuit judge-
ship to which Coolidge had appointed hini in 1925.^ ^ Yet once
the appointment had been made, opposition from northern
critics quickly took shape. Organized labor and its liberal sup-
porters remembered Parker as the judge who had handed down
the Red Jacket decision upholding "yellow dogs" contracts, and
the NAACP remembered that during his 1920 gubernatorial
campaign he had declared "the participation of the Negro in
politics" to be "a source of evil and danger to both races."^^
After asking the appointee whether he still held the same
views as in 1920 and receiving no reply, the NAACP launched a
vigorous campaign against Parker's confirmation. A campaign,
so Walter White thought, that eventually developed into "the
greatest political demonstration by the Negro since the Civil
War." Political pressure was applied through the black press;
through letters, telegrams, and phone calls; through petitions
and visitations to Congress; and through mass meetings staged
in black communities throughout the nation. Never, declared
the Chicago Defender, had blacks been so solidly united behind
any single political issue. Even Robert R. Moton, Hoover's
accommodationist advisor from Tuskegee, was demanding that
the administration either withdraw the nomination or "induce^
Judge Parker himself to withdraw." Blacks, he told Hoover,
could stand much from their "friends," but their "self-respect"
would not allow them to "swallow" the deliberate elevation to
the Supreme Court of a "man who has openly declared his con-
tempt for them.""
In response to the campaign mounted by the NAACP, the ad-
ministration induced Parker to issue a statement assuring the
"colored people" that he harbored no prejudice against them.
"Most observers agreed with the Chicago Tribune that the "Judiciary Com-
mittee will take favorable action and . . . the Senate will confirm the appoint-
ment with little if any opposition." See Chicago Tribune, 22 March 1930, p. 1.
"Walter White, "The Negro and the Supreme Court," Harper's 122 (January
1931): 161.
"Ibid., p. 162; Chicago Defender, 26 April 1930, p. 1; Moton to Newton
(Hoover's secretary), 18 April 1930, Parker file, HHP.
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promising that he would not deny them their rights under the
Constitution and the law, and declaring that his statement of
1920 had been intended only to keep the race issue out of the
campaign and clarify his party's abhorrence of what had hap-
pened during the Reconstruction era. As further evidence of his
fair-mindedness, publicity was also given to a court decision in
which he had held a segregation ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional and to statements from the few blacks who could be per-
suaded to endorse him, the most notable being James E. Shep-
ard, president of North Carolina's college for blacks." Such
arguments, however, failed to check the mounting protest,
which by now was having a noticeable effect upon northern
senators with large black constituencies. Sentiment against
Parker was so pronounced that some administration leaders
could not believe that the blacks alone were responsible. Behind
them, they suspected, was a "conspiracy" of southern Demo-
crats. Yet when the FBI was ordered to investigate this possibil-
ity, it could find no supporting evidence.^'
In the end, by a close vote of forty-one to thirty-nine, the
forty-one including nine Republicans who had ordinarily sup-
ported the administration, Hoover's appointee was rejected."
When confronted with threats from labor and from "a black
association" who had opposed the judge on the "wholly ficti-
tious" grounds that he had made "some remark bearing on white
supremacy," the president later recalled, the Republican sena-
tors had run "like white
"Dictation by telephone, Parker to Miss McGraw, 24 April 1930, Parker
file, HHP; Parker to Congressman David H. Blair, 9 April 1930, Parker file,
HHP; "Answer to Charge that Judge Parker Advocated Denial of Rights to
Colored People," memorandum, undated, Parker file, HHP.
"Memorandum, 25 April 1930, Parker file, HHP. According to this memo-
randum Mabel Willebrandt suggested the investigation.
"C/ii'cago Tribune, 8 May 1929, p. 1. Fourteen southern senators voted
against the appointment, eleven for confirmation. Of the thirty-nine who
voted for Judge Parker's confirmation, twenty-nine were Republicans; ten
were Democrats. The forty-one against included seventeen Republicans,
twenty-three Democrats, and one Farmer-Laborite.
"Herbert Hoover, Memoirs, vol. II, The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-
1933 (New York: MacMillan Co., 1952), p. 269.
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As noted previously, the NAACP's unprecedented campaign
against Parker's confirmation enjoyed the support of almost all
black leaders, militants and accommodationists. The fact that
Parker was not cor\firmed served to encourage and strengthen
those who had long advocated the adoption of a pressure-group
approach. With this plan, a united black community, acting
through appropriate political organizations, would reward its
friends and punish its enemies regardless of their party affilia-
tions. After the Parker incident, wrote Heywood Broun in
November 1930, Republican politicians could no longer say
with assurance that every black citizen who went to the polls
could be counted as another Republican vote. The old ties had
been loosened, and there was a growing chance that they might
slip away entirely."
One indication of the extent to which these successive waves
of black protest had altered party loyalties came in the
mid-term elections of 1930, especially in states where the
NAACP had set out to defeat Republican senators who had
voted for Parker's confirmation. In Kansas, in particular, a
strong campaign was mounted against Senator Henry J. Allen,
the man who had directed the pro-Parker forces in the state.
Eventually, even though Allen did his best to counter the
NAACP's effort and the administration sent in a black assistant
attorney general to speak in his behalf, the campaign was suc-
cessful. Traditionally, Republican senatorial candidates in Kan-
sas had been able to count on at least seventy-five percent of the
black vote. But in 1930, thanks to the NAACP's efforts, Allen
received less than twenty-five percent, a defection large enough
to give his Democratic opponent a narrow victory, i' In Ohio,
the NAACP scored a similar victory. There blacks organized
against Senator Roscoe C. McCullough, another supporter of
Parker's confirmation. Since depression conditions and the
"Heywood Broun, "The Black Voter," Crisis 37 (November 1930): 369.
"Memorandum, Walter White to Mr. Bagnall, Mr. Pickens, and Dr. Du-
bois, undated. Records of the NAACP, Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress; Telegram, White to Sumer A. Pumiss and W. C. Houston, 23 April
1930, Records of the NAACP; William Pickens, "The Negro Voter and
Allen," Crisis 37 (October 1930): 338.
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attractive personality of the Democratic candidate, Robert J.
Bulkley, had combined to make the senatorial contest an un-
usually close one, the black organizations found themselves
holding the balance of power. In Toledo, Columbus, Akron,
and Canton, black voters supported Bulkley by a margin of
three to one, thus helping insure McCullough's defeat."
Elsewhere, the NAACP was less successful. In Rhode Island,
for example, it had marked Senator Jesse H. Metcalf for defeat,
and in Delaware, it campaigned against Senator Daniel H.
Hastings. But in both states, even though large numbers of
black voters did desert the Republican party, the senators man-
aged to squeak through to narrow victories. The successes that
were scored, however, demonstrated clearly that Republican
politicians could no longer take the black vote for granted.
Given the new sense of militancy and alienation, the new confi-
dence in pressure-group politics, and the heightened race con-
sciousness stimulated by protests against Hoover's program for
the South, those who supported the outlook exemplified in Par-
ker's appointment could find the political costs to be high."
DEMONSTRATING a political punch in 1930, black critics
continued to expose instances of Hoover's "racism," instances
that in many cases were merely political blunders rather than
parts of the calculated conspiracy that was usually assumed in
the black press. One celebrated incident occurred in July 1930
when the War Department, after inviting the Gold Star Mothers
to visit the graves of their sons in France, proceeded under
orders from Secretary of War Hurley to organize segregated
transportation separating the white mothers from the black. Ex-
posed in the press, the incident created an immediate furor,
drawing sharp comments from both black leaders and white
"White, "The Negro and the Supreme Court," pp. 224, 225.
"Franklin, From Slavery, p. 526. The NAACP's campaign against the pro-
Parker Republican senators did not end in 1930. In 1932 it urged the defeat of
Senators Samuel Shortridge of California, Hiram Bingham of Connecticut,
and James E. Watson of Indiana. In 1934 it made similar efforts to unseat
Simeon Fess of Ohio and Felix Hebert of Rhode Island.
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liberals and generating political repercussions still felt two years
later. To black critics, it seemed that a federal discrimination
which had long been "fostered, cherished, condoned, and prac-
ticed," and which had become "glaringly flagrant, intensified,
and widened" since 1929, had now "reached the point of cruel
humiliation."" To liberal journals like The Nation, it was an
"incredibly stupid and ungracious gesture," demonstrating the
administration's inability to see blacks as "American citizens"
rather than "property to be shoved around back alleys and
smuggled in at side doors."" And to black voters it was a griev-
ance to be remembered. Writing from California in 1932, Mark
Requa would note the tremendous "bitterness and resentment"
felt by the state's blacks, largely, he thought, because they
remembered "the Gold Star Mothers being sent in a 'cattle ship;'"
and because of the president's silence and apparent approval of
the action.^*
A second incident, also used as proof of Hoover's "racism"
and again stemming from orders issued by the War Depart-
ment, involved alleged discrimination against the Tenth
Cavalry, a black army unit. As an economy move in 1931, the
size of the army was being cut. But as Robert Moton and other
black leaders pointed out, the scheduled reduction of the Tenth
Cavalry was far greater than that projected for white units. The
aim, they thought, was to turn the organization into a service
regiment, a change that would seriously damage the morale of
black troops. To make the discrimination all the more obvious,
the pertinent orders had cancelled promotions in the unit and
placed a ceiling on the number of black officers that it might
have."
Confronted with the protest from Moton, who, after all, was
an administration supporter. Hoover did order an investigation.
But having been assured by acting Secretary of War F. J. Payne
"Newspaper clipping, Philadelphia Tribune, 17 July 1930, Colored Ques-
tion file, HHP.
"Nation 131 (23 July 1930): 85-86.
"Telegram, Mark Requa to Newton, 23 April 1932, Colored Question file
HHP.
"Moton to Hoover, 18 September 1931, War Department file, HHP.
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that efficiency, not discrimination, was the goal, and that the
black troops involved were satisfied with "the conditions of
their service," he took no corrective measures. "After further
review of the subject," he told Moton, "I am convinced that the
present orders do not discriminate against colored enlisted men
and that they are necessary for the best interests of National de-
fense."^' Moton, whose interest in the subject stemmed partly
from his military background and pride in the record of black
military units, still thought otherwise." Significantly, so did the
leaders of the NAACP and eventually, after the matter had been
publicized, most of the black community. "Among colored
people and in the colored press," wrote Roy Wilkins in late
October 1931, the feeling had become general that the War
Department and the Hoover administration were proceeding
with a program that would "reduce their soldiers to the status of
labor battalions."" In the months that followed, as Hoover
continued to support the scheduled reduction, the issue re-
mained alive and became one more grievance in the indictment
that black critics were drawing up against the president and the
Republican party.
As further proof of Hoover's racism, such critics also fre-
quently pointed to four other matters: his policy toward the
black nation of Haiti, his alleged discrimination against blacks
in making appointments to federal service, his refusal to move
beyond ritualistic studies in tackling the social problems of the
black minority, and his seeming willingness to tolerate lynching
and violence in the South. In all of these matters, so the charge
ran, the president was acting like a white supremacist and dedi-
cated enemy of the black race, either because he in fact was one
or because he hoped that his stance would pay political divi-
dends in the South.
^'Memorandum, Payne to Hoover, 6 October 1931, War Department file,
HHP; Hoover to Moton, undated. War Department file, HHP.
^'William Hardin Hughes and Frederick D. Patterson, Robert Russa Moton
of Hampton and Tuskegee (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1956), p. 68.
"Memorandum, Roy Wilkins to Walter White, 20 October 1931, War
Department file, HHP.
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In regard to Haiti, a nation that had been under the control of
the United States since the Wilson administration, three charges
were frequently made. One accused Hoover of perpetuating a
racist-oriented imperialism by refusing to give Haitians their
complete independence. The second saw definite proof of
racism in his failure to appoint a single black to the special com-
mission that was set up to consider the possibilities of home
rule. And the third, added toward the end of his administration,
charged him with sabotaging the work of the commission and
refusing to adopt the timetable for withdrawal that it had re-
commended. His critics, moreover, were not appeased when he
did appoint a black commission, headed by Robert Moton, to
study and make recommendations for the improvement of the
Haitian educational system. This was too little and too late,
and, as Moton himself conceded, was largely "overshadowed in
the popular mind by the fact that no Negro was on the Haitian
Commission as such.""
The second item charging Hoover with making "fewer first-
class appointments of Negroes to office than any President since
Andrew Johnson" was widely accepted in the black commu-
nity, but could also be legitimately debated.'" The emphasis in
making the charge was usually upon the Haitian Commission,
the replacement of black-and-tans (southern black factions of
the G.O.P.) with lily-whites, and the continuation of inherited
policies of employment discrimination, both in the number
of blacks appointed and in the assignment of most of them to
menial tasks. Only rarely did Hoover receive credit for making
the traditional black appointments, those, for example, to the
office of Recorder of Deeds; the Ministry of Liberia; the munici-
pal judgeship in Washington, D.C.; and the collectorship of
internal revenue in New York City. Still more rarely was it
noted that working in cooperation with Robert Moton he had
raised the total number of black employees in the federal service
to a figure of 54,684 and had considerably increased the number
of black appointments to such posts as business specialist,
"Crisis 39 (November 1932): 362; Moton to Newton, 22 February 1930,
Colored Question file, HHP.
'"Crisis 39 (November 1932): 362.
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education advisor, assistant solicitor, and assistant district
attorney. A later black publication would concede that Hoover
did make as many "first-class" black appointments as Harding
and Coolidge combined, but during his presidency blacks found
this exeedingly difficult to believe.'^
The third matter, Hoover's alleged use of ritualistic studies,
conferences, and public relations committees as substitutes for
real action, was a part of the general charge of "do-nothingism"
that plagued Hoover's administration as the depression set in.
In reality, the president did order or sponsor several worthwhile
studies into the problems of black housing, education, child
care, and job opportunities. To conduct these, he appointed a
number of black study or advisory committees. Through
special divisions of the Committee on Recent Social Trends, the
White House Conference on Housing, the National Advisory
Committee on Education, for example, he subjected various as-
pects of the "Negro Problem" to scientific inquiry. Through his
long-time connections with the Julius Rosenwald Fund, he
arranged for the funding of and participated in the planning
that led up to a Conference on the Economic Status of the
Negro.^^ Yet to his critics, the studies themselves were merely
ways of postponing needed reforms and masking inaction,
while the black committees involved were nothing more than
"Newspaper clipping, Washington Times, 14 November 1930, Colored
Question file, HHP; Moton to Hoover, 15 January 1930, Colored Question
file, HHP; Moton to Hoover, 5 February 1930, Colored Question file, HHP;
Moton to Newton, 22 February 1930, Colored Question file, HHP; Newton to
James J. Davis, 25 March 1930, Colored Question file, HHP; "Federal Gov-
ernment," memorandum, undated. Colored Question file, HHP; Monroe
Work, ed., Negro Year Book, 1937-1938 (Tuskegee Institute: Negro Year
Book Publishing Co., 1937), p. 112.
'^"Report of the President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends,"
Recent Social Trends in the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 553-601; John Gries and James Ford, eds.. Report
of the Committee on Negro Housing (Washington, D.C: National Capital
Press, Inc., 1932); Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Mastick Hyde, The Hoover
Policies (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 84-86; Crisis 39 (Janu-
ary 1932): 468; "Report on the Conference on the Economic Status of the
Negro," 29 October 1930, Colored Question file, HHP. Interestingly, all of
these studies recommended more federal intervention to aid blacks.
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the worst sort of tokenism. "Only the silliest Negro," declared
the Chicago Defender, could believe that membership on a
"Negro committee here" and a "Negro committee there" was
any real substitute for an equitable appointment policy. And
unless Hoover purged himself of this fallacy, the paper threat-
ened, there would be another "Negro committee" giving him a
good deal of trouble in 1932."
Hoover's alleged toleration of lynching and violence in the
South, was used to complete the image of a racist, do-nothing,
politically motivated president. There had been thirteen more
lynchings in 1930 than in 1929, but Hoover's response that this
was "undermining of the very essence of both justice and
democracy" did not satisfy his black critics, who wanted more
than verbal condemnation.^^ He made no move to sponsor a
federal anti-lynching law. In one incident, his southern strategy
could be held responsible for murder of a black man by a white
mob. On July 29, 1930, S. S. Mincey, a black-and-tan leader in
Montgomery County, Georgia, had refused to cooperate with
an adminstration-backed lily-white group, had been threatened
with violence for his failure to do so, and later that evening had
been taken from his home and flogged to death. The administra-
tion's chief reaction was to regard the incident as "unfortu-
nate.""
.As HOOVER'S term wore on, and new evidence of his alleged
racism kept coming to light, the initial sense of grievance among
blacks, caused by the launching of his southern strategy, tended
to grow. Because of Hoover's poor image, many blacks seemed
ready to break their ties with the Republican party, although
this, of course, was not the only motivation. Black Americans,
to an even greater extent than most of their fellow citizens, were
"Chicago Defender, 25 April 1931, p. 14.
"Hoover to S. H. Reading, 13 August 1930, Colored Question file, HHP.
"Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching (Chapel Hill: University of
NorÇh Carolina Press, 1933), pp. 172-202; Josiah T. Rose to Walter Brown,
30 July 1930, Republican Party in Georgia file, HHP; Ben Davis to Walter
Newton, 4 August 1930, Republican Party in Georgia file, HHP; Rose to
Newton, 7 August 1930, Republican Party in Georgia file, HHP; Newton to
Davis, 13 August 1930, Republican Party in Georgia file, HHP; Rose to New-
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suffering from depression conditions. Already a marginal
group employed chiefly in unskilled jobs or domestic service,
they now became the first fired and last hired (particularly
when whites wanted their jobs). Many slipped toward a submar-
ginal level or a meager existence on relief, and others lost their
tenuous hold on middle class status that had been achieved
during the 1920s. Consequently, they fully shared the general
disillusionment with the Republican economic policies and
Hoover's inability or unwillingness to cope with the crisis or
even to provide adequate relief. He was, many of them con-
cluded, not only a racist but also an inept and unfeeling
president, one from whom the black community could expect
neither gratitude, equity, nor wisdom. Probably, even if he had
not attempted to woo the white South or become involved m
policies that seemed overtly racist, many blacks would still
have turned against him and his party for economic reasons.
By early 1932 the two motivations combined to produce a dis-
illusionment among blacks that had become stronger than ever.
The southern strategy, the clumsy handling of issues important
to the black community, and the lack of success in dealing with
the economic crisis were all receiving unprecedented attention
in the black press and among black activists. The administra-
tion, instead of developing the "understanding of . . . Negro
psychology" that Claude Barnett of the Associated Negro Press
had found lacking in 1930, seemed bent upon alienating an even
larger proportion of a group that had once been solidly Repub-
lican." This group, in spite of its disgust with Hoover and its
punishment of pro-Parker Republicans, was still somewhat
reluctant to break the emotional attachments of the past,
endanger the material benefits provided by some local Republi-
can machines, and join a rival party whose southern wing was
ton, 4 September 1930, Republican Party in Georgia file, HHP. Rose initially
blamed an intra-Masonic fight between Mincey and other blacks for Mincey's
death, but after an investigation by the Atlanta Interracial Commission had
brought out the facts, he was forced to admit that Mincey had died at the
hands of the lily-whites.
"Claude A. Barnett to George Akerson, 19 November 1930, Colored Ques-
tion file, HHP.
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openly racist. Straw polls conducted by Opportunity, the Urban
League's official publication, showed that a majority of the
blacks surveyed in April 1932 now intended to support the
Democrats, and that in May this majority had grown larger.
However the shift was still not an overwhelming one and was
far more pronounced among active blacks in the southern and
border states than it was elsewhere.''
After the election it became evident that to a considerable
extent the traditionally Republican blacks had fulfilled expecta-
tions by voting Democratic. In the cities of New York, St.
Louis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Columbus,
Toledo, Akron, Boston, Baltimore, and Kansas City, the rate of
black defections had been particularly high. Even in Republican
Iowa, Democrats had done well in the black precincts of Des
Moines and Waterloo.'*
The change on the part of blacks was, of course, not so great
as it would become later. A majority, despite all the furor about
Hoover's racism and many economic grievances, continued to
vote Republican, either from habit or because Roosevelt and
the Democrats seemed unlikely to make them very welcome in
the rival party. In cities like Chicago, where the local Republi-
can machine monopolized the distribution of patronage, blacks
were naturally reluctant to leave the party of the Great Emanci-
pator. In Chicago, in fact, the percentage of the vote that
Hoover received in the black wards actually increased from
seventy-five in 1928 to seventy-seven in 1932." Still, the black
"Ira D. Reid, "Opportunity Presidential Candidates Poll," Opportunity 10
(April, May 1932): 115,141. The April poll gave the Republicans 1,168 votes;
the Democrats 1,344; the Socialists 132; and the Communists 32. The May
poll gave the Democrats 2,064 votes; the Republicans 1,655; the Socialists
199; and the Communists 51.
^'Arthur Krock, "Did the Negro Revolt7" Opportunity 11 (January 1933):
19; Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1944), p. 496; James Braddis Morris, Jr., "Voting Behavior in Four Negro Pre-
cincts in Iowa Since 1924" (M.A. thesis. University of Iowa, 1946), p. 28.
"Franklin, From Slavery, p. 527; John Schact, "The Shift in the Negro Chi-
cago Vote from the Republican to the Democratic Party, 1928-1939" (M.A.
thesis. University of Iowa, 1966), pp. 1-2; Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politi-
cians (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 32.
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exodus had been substantial, and political commentators, who
in 1928 had been speculating about the future of the Republican
party in the South, were now analyzing the future of the blacks
in the Republican party. Writing in Opportunity, Arthur Krock
of the New York Times joined with various black spokesmen in
attributing the black defections to "Hoover's lily-white
Southern policy; his nomination of Judge John J. Parker of
North Carolina to the Supreme Court; the jim crowing of Negro
gold star mothers in France; failure to reward Negroes with
patronage; and the distribution of Negro regiments in the
regular army. . . . " But when it came to assessing the signifi-
cance of the defections, Krock was inclined to disagree with
those who saw them as permanent breaking away by blacks
from their "traditional moorings." The issues, he argued, were
temporary in nature, and for this reason, the black shift itself
was likely to be only temporary. Blacks would "vote Republi-
can again," he concluded, provided the party showed "the least
reason to merit it."''"
Hoover's southern strategy failed miserably as conditions in
the South were not propitious for Republicanizing the region.
The poorly conceived and badly implemented efforts to do so
worked in conjunction with the depression, the neglect of urban
problems and sensitivities, and Hoover's image as a racist in the
black press, to move a large segment of urban blacks to break
their traditional political ties, thus setting the stage for the
greater transformation associated with the New Deal.
"Krock, "Did the Negro Revolt?" p. 19; Opportunity 10 (November 1932):
336.
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